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THE WAR ON DIVERSITYt
John W. Reed*
Over the past decade or more there have been strong pressures to abolish
the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. With the strong backing of the
prestigious American Law Institute and many scholars, and with the support
of the Chief Justice, Senator Kennedy, and others, specific proposals have
been introduced in Congress, have been discussed at enormous length, and
have passed one or the other House but not both. At the moment, therefore,
we still have diversity jurisdiction, and it is safe to predict that abolition of
diversity will not occur during the present session of Congress. Nevertheless,
the long-term pressure continues, and those who, as I, would retain diversity
jurisdiction need to be continuingly alert. Moreover, we need to remind
ourselves from time to time what the argument is all about, and we need to
take into account any new information that may be relevant to one side of the
argument or the other.
The Board of Governors of the Barristers Society has taken note of the
status of the attacks on diversity, and has resolved to stay abreast of them and
to marshall the Society's resources in opposition to abolition in the event that
the movement picks up steam again.
My purpose here, then, is twofold: to review with you, and refresh your
recollections about, the abolitionists' arguments and the appropriate responses to them; and to encourage you, if you agree with my assessments, to
exert your influence on a sustained basis to assure the continued availability of
diversity jurisdiction-influence both at the public level, explaining to the
public whenever possible the importance to them of access to the federal
courts in diversity cases, and, at the personal level, communicating, with
whatever political clout you have, to your individual Congressmen the importance of diversity to their constituents, your clients.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION GENERALLY

As you know, Article III of the United States Constitution states that the
federal judicial power extends to controversies between citizens of different
states. Since the early days of the republic, Congress has exercised that
constitutional power by authorizing the federal courts to hear cases between
citizens of different states, provided that the money in controversy meets a
t Address delivered at the Annual Convention of the International Society of barristers, Marco Island,
Florida, March 24, 1983.
* Professor, University of Michigan Law School; Academic Fellow, International Society of Barristers.
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dollar value test-currently, $10,000. Also, a case involving parties of diverse
citizenship but begun in a state court may be removed to federal court if the
defendant is not a citizen of that state.
The other great branch of federal court jurisdiction consists of those cases
involving so-called federal questions. No one, of course, suggests that it is
inappropriate to have federal questions tried in federal courts, although it may
be noted that most kinds of federal question cases may be filed in state courts
as well. Federal court jurisdiction is exclusive only with respect to certain
specialized subject matter areas, such as admiralty, bankruptcy, and patent
cases.
But where a case is in federal court because of diversity only, it concerns,
by definition, a subject matter as to which the federal government has no
substantive interest. Product liability, personal injury, medical malpractice,
unpaid promissory note, breach of employment contract-these are illustrative of non-federal question cases that may wind up in federal court because of
the citizenship of the parties to the action and for no other reason. What is the
argument for drawing those cases into the federal system?
The easy, familiar rationale has been that diversity jurisdiction was created
to protect out-of-state litigants against local prejudice. In the early days of the
nation at least, it was thought to speed the economic growth of the country, to
afford some measure of security to investors developing the South and West,
and the like. It probably favored the Establishment, the Eastern money
lenders, who might need to collect debts or foreclose mortgages. One interesting but seldom mentioned way in which diversity helped non-residents was
that it gave litigants access to a court with lifetime, appointed judges, rather
than elected judges more likely subject to local popular political influence.
OBJECTIONS TO DIVERSITY

The attack on diversity jurisdiction has its most distinguished formulation
in a major study sponsored by the American Law Institute. That study has
been the starting point for most debates on the subject in the years since its
publication in 1969.
The argument for abolition is, at bottom, premised on two propositions:
first, that local prejudice is not a significant factor in the late twentieth
century; and second, that diversity cases congest the federal courts.
As to the first proposition, the claim is that local prejudice is no longer a
significant factor in judicial proceedings. Modern communications, the mobility of our society, the diminution of state interests and loyalties in the light
of the enormous growth of the federal government-all of these suggest that
prejudice against out-of-state litigants is no longer, if it ever was, a significant
basis for putting non-federal question cases in federal courts.
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A subsidiary aspect of this argument is that there often are important
prejudices having nothing to do with state lines and as to them there is no
forum option; and since options are not available to all litigants, it is unfair to
make them available to parties in the case of the one kind of prejudice.
That is the first argument for abolition: There is little geographical prejudice, and, moreover, to provide a protective measure for any prejudice that
there may be without making a similar protection available against other
prejudices violates-in a kind of lay terminology-"equal protection."
The second major argument for abolition is that diversity causes unacceptable congestion in the federal courts, that diversity cases are an unbearable
additional burden when the federal courts are already jammed with the cases
filed by a litigious society, and that, even granting some utility to diversity
jurisdiction, it represents a luxury that we cannot afford. 1
THE (UNCERTAIN) COSTS OF DIVERSITY

1 shall speak of these arguments in reverse order and begin with the
question of the costs of diversity jurisdiction to the federal system. Officials
of the Justice Department, supporting bills to abolish diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction, have on two occasions testified before Congressional committees that the abolition of diversity jurisdiction would save the federal government an estimated $9 million a year. That figure is barely more than two
percent of the expenditures for the entire federal judicial branch, which are
themselves less than one-tenth of one percent of total federal expenditures. 1
calculate that to be a mere two-thousandths of one percent of total federal
expenditures in the year in which the testimony was given. Recognizing that
with those figures the financial argument thus carried no weight, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts recently came up with its own
1. Other arguments are sometimes offered, but they do not pick up much of a following. For example, one
facile argument occasionally advanced seems to be a kind of "states' rights" argument, theoretically
addressing itself to the proper limits of federalism. The argument is that state cases should be in state courts,
with only federal cases (that is, federal question cases) in the federal courts. Although the argument has a
certain superficial attractiveness to it, it is interesting that none of the proponents would argue that all
federal cases should be in federal courts. As I mentioned earlier, there are only a few subject matters as to
which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Most federal question cases may be brought in the
state courts as well. If the argument be that political theory calls for state cases to be in state courts-and
state courts only-why should it not follow that federal cases should be in federal courts-and federal
courts only? Were that to be followed to its logical, symmetrical conclusion, the load imposed on the
federal courts (as federal question cases now filed in state courts were moved into the federal system) would
largely offset, and might exceed, the reduction generated by transfer of diversity cases to the state courts.
Another argument in the area of limits on federalism is that since under Erie v. Tompkins the federal
courts must apply state substantive law, it is inappropriate and even demeaning for the federal courts to be
deciding diversity cases, applying-even announcing-what the court believes is, or should be, the law of
the state-making the federal judge (in Jerome Frank's colorful phrase) the "ventriloquist's dummy to the
courts of some particular state." Richardson v. C.I.R., 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942).
But I here limit my comments to the two major propositions urged by the abolitionists: (1) local prejudice
is no longer a significant factor, and (2) granting any utility, nevertheless the diversity cases represent an
unbearable additional burden on the federal courts.
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figures, projecting savings of approximately $30 million a year over the next
five years if diversity were abolished, or a total of nearly $160 million. Even
with this larger figure (based on some questionable assumptions, as I shall
mention in a moment) it is clear that the dollar cost of diversity jurisdiction is
small absolutely, and de minimis relatively-something like six-thousandths
of one percent of the federal budget. If diversity jurisdiction were of only
marginal utility, it still might be justified at that small cost.
Moreover, the assumptions on which the cost calculations were made are
unscientific and soft. In every instance they give evidence of a bias toward
higher numbers than an impartial application of the raw data would support. A
staff member of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives has
conceded that the figures are speculative, generated for use in the political
context: "If a Representative wants cost estimates to be an issue, we will
generate figures that seek to make cost an issue. Everyone knows these
figures are not factual but are to be used only for political purposes. This is not
2
a cost issue but a political contest."
It is also unclear what particular savings would be produced by abolition of
diversity cases. In terms of present operations, about all that would be saved
would be the jury fees. No one is suggesting reducing the number of judges or
courtrooms, and few reductions in support staff seem likely. The marginal
costs of diversity jurisdiction initially would be small indeed-almost surely
smaller than predicted by the Administrative Office. The argument may be,
however, that the savings will be prospective-that with no more diversity
cases, the increase in the number of filings will be reduced, thus reducing the
need for more new judges, more new courtrooms, more new clerks, in the
years ahead. Indeed, the Administrative Office and the Congressional Budget
Office do in fact predict larger savings in the years ahead than in the
immediate years.
What that argument adds up to, of course, is that diversity jurisdiction is
responsible for a substantial part of the work of the courts, that it contributes
significantly to the congestion with which we are all familiar, and that
congestion will inevitably necessitate a continuing expansion of judicial
services at some additional cost.
No one would argue that diversity jurisdiction imposes no additional costs
on the federal judicial system or that it does not play some role in the
congestion experienced by the federal courts. The extent of those costs and of
that congestion, however, is far less certain, far more speculative, than we
have been led to believe.
Diversity cases have grown at an irregular rate. On the whole they have
2. Statement of David Beier, Assistant Counsel, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, in telephone
interview with E. James Potchen, East Lansing, Michigan, January, 1983, in connection with preparation
of the latter's unpublished study of the costs of diversity jurisdiction.
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increased in number, but they have not increased as a percentage of total cases
filed. There simply is no evidence that diversity cases are proportionately a
larger part of the federal judicial burden.
In passing, two particular years are interesting to observe. In 1958, the
amount in controversy requirement was raised from the old $3,000 figure to
$10,000. Most of us have assumed that the jurisdictional minimum does not
screen out many cases, certainly not cases in which damages are unliquidated.
Yet cases filed under diversity in fiscal 1959 dropped from 26,000 the year
before to 18,000, apparently in partial response to the increase in jurisdictional minimum from $3,000 to $10,000. There is a consensus that the
$10,000 figure adopted in 1958 ought now to be raised to $25,000. Whether
there would be another one-third drop in the case filings in response to such a
change no one knows. But at least one might try that remedy as a cost and
caseload control device before the more draconian remedy of abolition.
The other interesting year is 1979. The growth in diversity filings has been
relatively steady-steadily slow, that is-over the past twenty years or so.
But an interesting change took place in 1979. In fiscal 1979 the rate of growth
in diversity filings increased substantially over the average rate of the preceeding several years. What happened? That increase immediately followed
the passage of the omnibus judgeship bill, which authorized some 117 new
district judgeships. Whether there is a connection between these two facts is
not clear. The increase in judges, however, was widely looked upon as a
means to improve the handling of cases in the federal courts, and it is
conceivable that the legal community responded by filing more cases in
federal courts because of a perception of increased ease in getting them
handled. In short, the system may be inelastic, with the caseload expanding to
fill the available slots. (I am told there is a similar phenomenon in the field of
medical care, where the addition of a physician to a group or a community has
the effect of increasing the total physicians' caseload and increases the cost to
the community, but no other health care indices change.)
One other set of data is intriguing in this context. Over the past several
years, as filings have increased, a larger proportion-not a larger number
only, but a larger proportion-of filed cases are being settled without trial,
and two things have been decreasing: the proportion of jury trials and the time
from filing to resolution.
To state it slightly differently: The percentage of cases filed that reach trial
has decreased constantly over the past twelve years. While diversity cases
have always had a higher proportion reaching trial than total civil cases, the
rate of decline in this percentage has been even greater for diversity cases than
for federal civil cases as a whole. These trends have a significant impact on
future "workload" since trial activity is the most resource consumptive
process in the federal court system.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF BARRISTERS QUARTERLY

There is a steep decline in the percentage of cases reaching trial and a
gradual decline in the percentage of cases requiring the jury, and these result
in one forecast that there will be fewer diversity cases with a jury trial in 1987
than in 1982, despite a 45% increase in the number of diversity cases filed.
I quickly concede that these figures are ambiguous, and they do not tell us
what is cause and what is effect. What I would have you understand,
however, is that the easy assertions and generalizations of those who would
use cost and caseload figures as the basis for abolishing (or for that matter,
retaining) diversity jurisdiction are deluding us and perhaps themselves. The
reality is vastly more complicated. At a session of an institute on court
management some years ago there was reported a study with respect to adding
a judge to the then Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which concluded that the
addition of a judge actually diminished available judge time in that large
circuit. The processes of communication among the judges back and forth,
and around and around, would take a bit more time of each judge in order to
include the new member of the court; and in the aggregate, those bits of time
added up to more judicial time than the new member would provide. What
looked like a good thing-adding a judge-was not clearly helpful.
In short, we do not yet have enough knowledge about the effects of case
filings, jury trial elections, the availability of more judges and judicial
facilities, and the like, to be able to make secure assertions as to what these
things do to the functioning of the system. Without more sophisticated
understanding, we would be well advised to conclude that, at two percent-or
six percent-of the judicial budget, the dollar costs are not controlling, and
make the decision as to the wisdom of diversity jurisdiction on its substantive
values, not on highly debatable, pseudo-exact arithmetic and fiscal calculations.
THE (DOUBTFUL)

CAPACITY OF STATE COURTS TO ABSORB DIVERSITY CASES

It is argued that diversity cases should be shifted from the federal courts,
which are overburdened, to the state courts, which can easily absorb them
because of the state systems' collective larger capacity. And the Conference
of Chief Justices has stated that the state court systems are "able and willing"
to assume all or part of the diversity jurisdiction currently exercised by the
federal courts. That's very attractive: Send cases out, reduce congestion, save
money, and create no problems for the states.
Despite the brave statements of the chief justices, the ability of the state
systems to absorb diversity cases is suspect. No one really knows what the
actual impact of transferring the diversity cases would be on the state courts.
The evidence consists primarily of an exercise in long division, showing that
the number of diversity cases divided by the number of state trial judges yields
an apparently reasonable quotient. But the "average caseload" approach
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completely ignores not only the differences between states but the differences
within each state as well. We know that litigation tends to cluster around large
urban population centers. Urban center cases tend to be more complex.
Metropolitan area state courts tend to be just as crowded if not more crowded
than federal courts (which are, by and large, also in larger cities).
Moreover, not every dollar saved by the federal government in abolishing
diversity jurisdiction would result in a dollar earned. The Conference of Chief
Justices has repeatedly stated that the state courts will require federal funds to
permit them to be "able and willing" to handle diversity cases; and the
conference insists that the funds should have no strings attached lest the
independence of the state court systems be compromised.
About three years ago the National Center for State Courts studied the
status of dockets and the pace of litigation, and it compared the median
disposition time (that is, from filing to judgment or other disposition) in state
and federal courts in some seventeen urban centers. In sixteen of these
seventeen, the median disposition time for state courts exceeded that for the
federal court. Let me offer three striking illustrations: the median disposition
times for
Detroit-state: 788 days; federal: 274 days
Pittsburgh-state: 583 days; Federal: 214 days
Miami-state: 331 days; federal: 122 days
Last fall the National Law Journal reported that the Supreme Court of
Alabama had requested of the state's trial courts a two-week moratorium on
civil and criminal jury trials. Although the measure was a response to an
Alabama budget crisis and was simply designed to save jury costs, it provides
an interesting and timely counterpoint to the glib assertion by the Conference
of Chief Justices that the state courts are "able and willing" to take on all the
diversity cases.
THE UTILITY OF DIVERSITY

Because the cost of diversity to the federal system is relatively uncontrolling, the relationship between the existence of diversity and court congestion
far from clear, and the ability of state courts to absorb diversity cases without
spending at least as much money as the federal system might save doubtful, it
becomes apparent that the real question is not cost, but whether there is an
important utility in maintaining diversity jurisdiction.
In short, what is the current justification, if any, for making federal courts
available to litigants who could just as well bring their cases in the state
courts? I submit that there are values in diversity jurisdiction which justify its
continuance even if the cost were high, which it is not.
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Avoiding Prejudice through an Alternative Forum
As I said, diversity jurisdiction probably was created to provide out-ofstate litigants the opportunity to avoid in-state bias or prejudice. The critics
argue that, however valid the point may have been two hundred years ago,
there is no longer any significant prejudice in state courts against out-of-state
litigants. The trial lawyers of the nation, and the trial judges, know better:
there is local prejudice. Said a Texas federal district judge:
It is still my opinion that a Brooklyn Yankee driving a Cadillac automobile
who has a serious accident with a Boeme farmer of German descent who is
driving a pick-up truck cannot expect
a fair trial in Comal County, whether
3
he be a plaintiff or a defendant.
Additionally, there is difficulty in isolating the home state prejudice from
other prejudices which may be harbored by those in the locale of the court.
Take the Texas example: Is the Comal County jury anti-Yankee or just
anti-Cadillac? Pro-pick-up or perhaps anti-non-German descent? When a
Harlem-born black doctor sues the sheriff's son in a rural state court in the
South, are his chances of getting a fair trial diminished because he is from
New York, because he is black, or because he is a doctor?4
Diversity jurisdiction has evolved to the point where it now offers its
protection to those who might otherwise suffer from many kinds of prejudice.
Although the problem is more often one for the out-of-state plaintiff or
defendant, there may be an "injustice factor" pressing on an in-state plaintiff. For example, Robert Begam, to whom I am indebted for a number of
these ideas, offers the illustration of a Navajo couple killed in a northern
Arizona highway accident with an interstate tractor-trailer registered in
Texas. The surviving minor children have a choice, with diversity jurisdiction, between a state court action in Holbrook, Arizona, with an all-white
rural jury, and a federal action in Phoenix with a state-wide jury. The
implications for the plaintiffs are obvious.
The heart of the matter is that the availability of an alternative forum is
often a necessary "condition of justice," well worth its minor costs. Prejudice cannot be eliminated, but the availability of the federal forum for some
cases gives litigants a choice that can be used to avoid or minimize prejudice
in those cases where it is most likely to occur. And though some suggest that
state juries are not different from federal juries because they are drawn from
the same population, the trial lawyers of the nation know better: there are
dramatic differences between one-county jury panels in state courts and
3. Quoted by Robert Begam, Fellow of the International Society of Barristers, in Hearings on S. 679
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1979).
4. Id. at 171-72.
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district-wide (often state-wide) panels in the federal courts. A fair result often
depends on the ability to avoid a narrow local bias, as in the suit by the
Navajos mentioned earlier; and one could multiply the examples.
To the objection that this is "forum shopping," I say, what's so wrong
about forum shopping? All of us know that arguably meritorious claims and
defenses may be greatly jeopardized by procedural quirks, judicial prejudice
or inadequacy, local (not just interstate) prejudice, docket backlogs, and the
like. It may be that I am arguing for a kind of free enterprise in the selection of
forums; and the argument should not be carried too far, of course. But the
history of our law is one of development through competition among the
courts. A significant portion of the remedies that we now take for granted
came into existence because parties had the freedom to move from King's
Bench to Common Pleas, from law to chancery, from Exchequer to King's
Bench, and the like. I believe that the possession of options in the litigation
process is a "condition of justice."
In short, the availability of an alternative forum is not a bad thing, but a
necessary means to a fair result. A theoretical judicial system in a theoretical
monolithic society might not need alternatives. But justice is not an abstraction. We deal with a real system in a real, complex, pluralistic society; and in
that real world there is prejudice. The concurrent availability of a federal
forum is often the only bulwark against that prejudice.
Federal and State Courts as Working Partners
It is perhaps another way of saying the same thing to state that the quality of
the substantive and procedural law in the nation is significantly higher
because of the creative tension and interchange that diversity jurisdiction
affords between the state and federal judicial systems. That federal courts
sometimes decide questions of state law is not undesirable, but in fact is
beneficial. There are many benefits in our present system of federal courts as
working partners with the state courts in the enforcement of rights arising
under state law just as state courts are working partners with the federal courts
in the enforcement of many rights arising under federal law. The concurrent
jurisdictions of the state and federal courts have permitted the migration of
ideas between the two systems. Each has learned from the other. This
interaction has contributed materially to constant improvement in civil and
criminal procedural rules, rules of evidence, and court administration
techniques. We inevitably impede this useful process if we isolate the federal
courts from the state courts in terms of the kinds of cases each can hear.
Without diversity cases many lawyers who now practice in both federal and
state courts will have much less occasion to be in both, and the flow of ideas in
each direction will materially diminish.
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Attractiveness of FederalJudicial Service
Another familiar justification for diversity jurisdiction is that it makes
federal judicial service more attractive to the best and wisest legal minds.
Already it is hard to recruit (and lately, to keep) excellent federal judges. The
quality of men and women drawn to federal judgeships will be better if the
federal courts continue to deal with a broad range of questions, aided by
diversity jurisdiction, rather than be restricted to an unbalanced-even
boring-diet heavily consisting of such federal questions as Social Security
entitlement, immigration status, and auto theft, but lacking in the rich protein
of private law. The quality of judges willing to subsist on such thin gruel is
likely to be lower.
ALTERNATIVES TO ABOLISHING DIVERSITY

The base problem which must be addressed is, roughly stated, court
congestion. It is not the disproportionate fault of diversity jurisdiction,
however, that many federal courts are crowded. Lawyers and their clients
have not increased their reliance on diversity. Indeed the diversity percentage
of total caseload in the federal courts has not increased. The congestion comes
from the increased criminal caseload, from the statutory creation of new
federal causes of action, from the geometric increase in controversy that
comes with increased population, from the growth of complex controversies,
and not least, from the increasing litigiousness of the American public and
their government.
The solution is not to limit the public's access to the system by reducing the
scope of its jurisdiction when that jurisdiction is serving a useful purpose in
our society. What are possible solutions or, at least, ameliorative measures?
Additional Judgeships
An obvious possibility is to increase further the capacity of the system as
the 95th Congress did in authorizing additional judgeships. That that measure
is suspect is suggested by the fact, mentioned earlier, that the most recent
appointment of new judges was followed by a significant increase in the rate
of growth in case filings. Whether those are cause and effect we do not yet
know; but if it is not mere coincidence, then it is at least doubtful that
additional judgeships would be the major element of any solution.
ProceduralImprovements
Another element of a possible solution is a continuation of efforts to
improve the efficiency of the system, such as experimentation with compulsory arbitration for certain kinds of cases, enlargement of magistrates' juris-
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diction, reduction of the abuse of civil discovery procedures, and the like.
Systems of alternatives, such as mediation, conciliation, summary jury trials,
and mini-trials, need careful consideration. I am fully aware that each of these
has its own problems and is in its own way debatable. Indeed, this Society
generally opposes the adoption of alternative modes of dispute resolution
whenever they appear to diminish individual rights. But certainly a study of
these various possibilities must continue, and, even with some disadvantages,
particular changes may be preferable to the flawed version of theoretical
rights in a system of justice delayed or overpriced. 5
Limiting, but Not Abolishing, Diversity
There are two proposals afoot to limit current diversity jurisdiction that
offer some promise of reduction in federal court caseloads while leaving
intact a large part of that jurisdiction's utility. One of them is clearly desirable
and will surely be adopted if it can be separated from the abolition movement.
The second seems to me to be undesirable and should be resisted.
Raising the amount in controversy. The first, of course, is an increase in the
amount in controversy requirement, from the present $ 10,000 to $25,000.
The amount has not been changed since 1958, and the change in the value of
the dollar justifies an increase in the floor to at least $25,000. There is no
significant opposition to that change.
Excluding the resident plaintiff.A second proposal is to curtail diversity
jurisdiction by denying a plaintiff access to any federal district court in the
state of which he is a citizen. The argument is that a plaintiff suing in his own
state cannot be said to need a federal court for the purpose of avoiding local
prejudice. But such a change would deny federal court access to the Navajo
plaintiffs, mentioned above, with likely adverse effects. It would also deprive
the injured individual who has a claim against a national corporation (incorporated and having its principal place of business in another state) of access to
the federal court in his home state, even though he may prefer that court
because he can get his case to trial there in six months or a year rather than the
five years it will take in his state court. His alternative, if he can afford it,
would be to start his suit in a federal court in another state. Some litigants
would be able to do that. In those cases the only accomplishment will have
been to increase the cost of litigation. Surely that is something we deplore.
John Shepherd made this point in a delightful way, speaking to the political
interests of those legislators who would abolish or curtail diversity jurisdic5. See Olson, Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, 17
(1982).
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tion. Testifying before the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, he objected to
the proposal to deny jurisdiction when an in-state plaintiff sues an out-of-state
defendant, saying:
I suggest to you, Senator [Metzenbaum], that in almost every community in
this country, the Federal building is the building that is the best maintained
and the grounds look good and it is the people's building. This bill will tell
the working people in that town that that is not their courthouse. They can't
file a suit there. It is somebody else's courthouse. If they get hurt by some
national corporation, they can't use that building. I suggest to you that
closing the Federal courthouse to the working people of this country
is a
6
very serious thing. It is far more serious than just the lawyers.
THE TRIAL BAR'S SUPPORT FOR DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

It is significant that support of diversity jurisdiction is almost unanimous
among the trial bar, on both sides of the table. Congressman Kastenmeier and
others have charged that the profession's position is one of self-interest.
Lawyers, they say, simply want to maintain all their options in the "litigation
game." Attributing self-interest to lawyers who favor diversity jurisdiction
overlooks the point that it is the citizen-client whose interests are at stake and
who wants to use the federal courts. The fact that the lawyer has the technical
knowledge on which the client relies should not obscure the fact that the
lawyer is merely acting for the client. It will not wash to charge the legal
profession with purely, or even predominantly, self-interest. That indeed is
what John Shepherd had in mind when he said, "It is far more serious than
just the lawyers."
It is infinitely sounder public policy to fund and administer the necessary
judicial paraphernalia to meet a strongly perceived need than to eliminate
from the courts a whole class of litigation because some of those courts have
become crowded. It is more important to meet the need than to adjust the
problem to fit the answer.
Professor James William Moore, the dean of authorities on federal courts,
procedure, and jurisdiction, has written:
The Constitution envisages a working partnership between the state and
federal courts under which each forum may enforce the law of the other
sovereign whenever it is deemed appropriate .... The whittling away or
surrendering of diversity jurisdiction which serves a legitimate function
under the Constitution only weakens the federal system under which we
have long prospered and, with fair success, have done justice between
disputants. 7
The present system of coordinate federal and state jurisdiction has been an
6. Hearings, op. cit. supra n. 3, 161.
7. 1 MOORE FEDERAL PRACnCE

0.71[3.-2] (2d ed. 1978).
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important part of our federalism that we should not lightly abandon. Bills to
abolish diversity jurisdiction have been passed by the House twice in recent
years, but both times died in the Senate. In 1982, the House Judiciary
Committee once again approved a bill to abolish diversity, by a 16 to 10 vote,
but the House did not pass the bill. Political support for the abolition of
diversity has markedly decreased since the high point of the push for diversity
abolition in 1978. Recent votes have been much closer than the overwhelming
support voted in that year. Even the 1982 Committee vote of 16 to 10
apparently would have been 16 to 12 if all the Representatives had been
present for the vote.
Although the American Law Institute, the Carter Justice Department, and
the Reagan Justice Department have all supported diversity abolition, and the
Reagan Justice Department still supports it, virtually every national bar
group-the American Bar Association and all the societies and colleges and
academies and associations of trial lawyers-and virtually every state bar
association is on record in opposition to the abolition of diversity; and most of
them oppose also the curtailment of diversity in the case of the in-state
plaintiff. This counter-movement by the profession is thought by some to
have effectively eliminated political support for any diversity legislation
(other than amount in controversy) in the near future.
On the occasions when I have spoken to Congressmen about diversity
abolition, I have found them remarkably sympathetic to the position that
diversity jurisdiction should be maintained.
One Congressman, not a
member of the Judiciary Committee, said to me that when he voted for the
abolition bill he had no idea that the profession generally opposed it. Indeed, he had been given the impression that it was an uncontroversial,
obviously benign reform urgently needed by the system. The facts simply do
not bear that out, and legislators are quite persuadable, possibly by means of
information but certainly by means of legitimate political influence. Their
views change abruptly when they learn that the bar is overwhelmingly
opposed to abolition.
As I say, the steam seems to have left the abolition drive. Yet the proposals
keep appearing. The American Law Institute and some of my colleagues in
the academic world undoubtedly will keep writing and promoting. Continuing vigilance will be required to preserve this important attribute of our justice
system-this "condition of justice." I hope you will keep yourselves informed. The Barristers Society, through the actions of its Board of Governors
and its publications, will seek to assist you in that regard. I hope also that you
will, whenever you have the opportunity, remind your Congressman of your
views.

